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The particular position of The Continuum among the
constructivist mathematics of the twentieth century
1 In 1918, The Continuum was published, the first and greatest book of Hermann Weyl
about the foundations of  mathematics.  The position he defended is  one of  the first
members of a wide family of approaches of mathematics we call now “constructivism”,
which has been developed since the beginning of the twentieth century. Those atypical
ways  of  doing  mathematics  involve  restricting  the  mathematical  processes  to
constructive  ones.  We  can  give  several  senses  to  this  notion  of  “construction”.  In
particular, we can restrict the universe of mathematical objects (to only objects that can
be, in some sense, “constructed”), or restrict the mathematical demonstrations in order
to  make  the  notion  of  mathematical  existence  coincide  with  the  notion  of  “being
constructible”.
2 Those  kinds  of  approach  were  first  regarded  as  too  restrictive.  Indeed,  being
constructivist in the beginning of the twentieth century compelled us to abandon a
large part  of  the most powerful  results  of  mathematics.  This situation has changed
since the rapid expansion of constructivist mathematics from the end of the 1960’s. The
works of mathematicians like Errett Bishop and Per Martin Löf spurred faster growth of
constructivist  reconstructions  of  mathematics.  This  expansion  still  continues.
Therefore,  we no longer  wonder if  the constructivist  approach is  able  to  construct
powerful mathematics but rather if we have good reasons to accept the restriction of
our mathematical processes to constructive ones.
3 The theory of recursive functions and the development of computer science have given
favourable arguments for the search of constructive mathematics with a domain of
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study  that  coincides with  the  effectively  computable  objects  (functions,  numbers,
operations and sets). This is a strong sense we can give to the notion of “construction”.
Nevertheless,  we  have  to  remember  that  the  original  ideas  that  founded  the
constructive approaches were those of mathematicians who sought sound foundations
for  coherent  and meaningful  mathematics.  That’s  why,  in  order  to  understand the
motives that guide the development of constructive mathematics, we have to review
the works of  those pioneers  who conceived the constructive approach as  a  trial  to
answer the problem of the foundations of mathematics.
4 Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer  is  regarded  as  the  first  mathematician  to  have
systematically  developed  such  an  approach.  For  Brouwer,  mathematics  is  a  free
creation  of  the  human  mind.  His  personal  approach  on  constructive  mathematics,
usually  called  “intuitionism”,  was  therefore  guided  by  the  internal  nature  of
mathematics. Historians and philosophers of science have remembered his work as the
beginning of constructivist approaches because of its great scope. Indeed, Brouwer had
developed his intuitionist position throughout his life. Nevertheless, the success of this
author  has  partly  concealed  other  previous  constructivist  approaches,  which  were
based on noticeably different positions on philosophy of science. The Continuum is one
of the most important of those first attempts.
5 We could think that constructivist mathematics could be studied without reading such
a work.  Indeed,  Hermann Weyl  himself  said  at  the  beginning  of  the  1920’s  that  he
joined the intuitionist position of Brouwer, which was a more daring criticism to the
spirit of Set Theory than his own. Should we conclude that The Continuum is just a kind
of sketch of the completed constructivist position: that of Brouwer? We shouldn’t. In
spite  of  the  similarity  between  the  two  approaches,  which  justifies  that  they  both
belong  to  the  wide  family  of  constructivism,  the  methods  and  motives  of  the  two
authors are rather different. First, the constructivism of Brouwer calls the Excluded
Middle Principle (and so classical logic) into question, whereas Hermann Weyl wants to
give  consistency  to  mathematics  in  maintaining  the  Excluded  Middle  Principle  by
restricting  the  universe  of  mathematical  entities.  We  can  explain  this  difference
because  L.E.J. Brouwer  more  violently  criticizes  the  usual  notion  of  infinity  in
mathematics than Hermann Weyl. For L.E.J Brouwer, arithmetic (of natural numbers)
makes a bad use of this notion as well as analysis (of real numbers) (for example [Weyl
1949,  150–151]).  For  him,  a  proposition  that  speaks  about  the  totality  of  natural
numbers is nonsense if  there is no constructive prove of it  or any counterexample.
When he understood the work of L.E.J Brouwer, Hermann Weyl admitted that we have
no more intuition about the totality of natural numbers than about real numbers. On
this particular point, the position of The Continuum was not radical enough. There was a
last residue of the Platonic position about mathematics.
6 But  we  can  see  a  more  profound  difference  in  the  motives  of  the  two  thinkers,  a
difference into the nature of the philosophical thoughts that are involved. Indeed, the
philosophy of science developed in The Continuum is not purely internal to mathematics
like  Brouwer’s  one.  Hermann Weyl  tries  to  provide  a  type  of  mathematics  that  is
required for the construction of physics. The Continuum is therefore only a part of an
ambitious  epistemological  program  about  natural  science  and  its  link  with
mathematics. It is significant that the main work of Hermann Weyl about the general
theory of relativity,  Space-Time-Matter,  is  published the same year as The Continuum.
Hermann Weyl  thinks  that  we can’t  construct  a  correct  philosophy of  mathematics
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without knowing the interactions between mathematics and physics. The originality
and ambition of this epistemological program makes the study of The Continuum still
interesting. It gives us new motive to accept a kind of (moderate) constructive position
about  mathematics,  in  order  to  be  able  to  set  up  strong  interactions  between
mathematics and physics.
 
The Continuum Problem, a Bridge between the
Philosophy of Mathematics and the Philosophy of
Physics of Hermann Weyl
7 In The Continuum,  Hermann Weyl defended his position on philosophy of  science by
focussing  on  the  continuum  problem  (a  problem  involving  simultaneously
mathematics, physics and phenomenology of perception). We can begin examining this
problem by noting that the intuitive and the mathematical continua do not coincide.
The intuitive continuum is given immediately by our perceptive intuitions of time and
space extension. “Immediately” means that we set at a phenomenal level, before any
conceptual reconstruction and, in particular, before the physical one. The objects given
by this perceptive intuition are continuous in that their parts are closely related and
are  themselves  new  continuous  objects.  The  whole  is  before  the  parts.  At  this
perceptive level, the operation of division never leads us to something like “indivisible
points” that would constitute the continuous object. On the contrary, the mathematical
continuum,  as  we  understand it  since  the  development  of  mathematical  analysis,  is
actually constituted by individual isolated points: the real numbers. Hermann Weyl calls
this mathematical conception of the continuum “atomistic” as opposed to the intuitive
one.
8 In accordance with Hermann Weyl’s general epistemological program, his answer to
the continuum problem is directed toward the possibility of providing foundations for
physics. For Weyl, in 1918, the atomistic feature of the mathematical continuum does
not  imply  that  analysis  failed  in  its  task.  The  mathematical  continuum  has  to  be
atomistic because we must construct it arithmetically, beginning our construction at the
discrete  infinite  sequence  of  the  natural  numbers  that  is  the  very  foundation  of
mathematical  thought  [Weyl  1918,  48].  There  is  an  insurmountable  gap  between
analysis  and the perceptive intuition.  To solve the continuum problem, we have to
assume  this  gap  and  therefore  to  assume  the  atomistic  position  inherent  to
mathematical analysis. Analysis is not a phenomenology of perception but a theory of
the Continuum. In this way, it must be ultimately justified by its insertion in the whole
theory of physics [Weyl 1918, 93].
9 To construct this arithmetical continuum, two types of objects are then relevant: sets
and functions. They have to be introduced in order to express the physical continuity of
space  and  motions.  All  the  mathematical  and  logical  work  accomplished  by
Hermann Weyl in the first chapter of The Continuum could be regarded as an analysis of
the notion of function (and of the notion of set that is a particular case of the first, for
Hermann Weyl, as we will see). Following Hermann Weyl, we should remark that, in the
history of mathematics and physics, we find a first way to think about a function. It is
derived from algebra. According to this view, a function is a formula obtained by the
iterated  applications  of  the  four  usual  algebraic  operations  (+, *, −, /)  and  of  some
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transcendental elementary functions (sin, exp, etc.) This position is insufficient because
this notion of function is not enough extended to express all the functions needed by
modern analysis and physics [Weyl 1918, 45–47]. At the opposite side, we have another
conception  of  function  that  is  very  general  and  quite  vague.  According  to  this,  a
function is thought of as a pure correspondence between two domains of objects. This
correspondence is pure in the sense that it is thought of independently of the existence
of  an  explicit  relation  that  links  together  the  elements  of  those  domains.  This
conception is often attributed historically to Dirichlet [Weyl 1918, 23]. For Weyl, this
notion of function is nonsensical and can’t have any physical application.
10 In order to avoid these difficulties, the first chapter of The Continuum gives new bases to
the notions of sets and functions. To be useful for physics, a function has to be thought
as an intelligible relation. That’s why Weyl assumes that a set or a function can’t have
any sense if it is not linked to a law; i.e. an explicitly constructed relation. But, in order
to  give  all  its  extension  to  the  notion  of  relation,  Weyl  proposes  to  replace  the
elementary  algebraic  operations  by  some  general  logical  principles.  This  choice  of
restricting the mathematical functions to those which can be defined by a logically
constructed  relation  is  the  main  reason  why  we  can  think  about  the  position  of
Hermann Weyl in The Continuum as a member of the family of constructivism.
 
The Obstacles to the Intelligibility of the First Chapter
of The Continuum
11 The reading of the first chapter of The Continuum is a difficult exercise because of the
unusual symbolism used by Weyl, because of the distance with Set Theory with which
we are used to, and because of Weyl’s choice not to present his final system directly but
all  the  previous  steps  also.  (In  his  introduction to  the  English  translation,  Stephen
Pollard  expresses  clearly  those  difficulties.  [Weyl  1918,  xv]).  This  paper  is  a
contribution toward the interpretation of Weyl’s intentions in the first chapter of The
Continuum.
12 We aim to clarify this matter, using other Weyl papers of the same period or later, and
measuring the differences that separate Weyl’s notions of sets and functions from those
we use now. We don’t make a complete reconstruction of Weyl’s system in a modern
fashion,  such  approaches  have  been  already  proposed  (cf.  [Feferman  1988]  and
[Feferman 1997]), but rather focus on some central problems in the nature of natural
numbers and the shift Weyl is obliged to apply to the traditional distinction between
intension and extension.
13 We have already stressed that, in order to give to analysis an entire intelligibility, and
applicability to physics, Weyl has to impose some restrictions on the entities admitted
in the mathematical universe. Before specifying the exact interpretative problems with
which  we  are  concerned,  let’s  give  a  quick  presentation  of  the  main  principles  of
restriction he adopts. They can be sketched by four terms: definitionism, intuitionism,
predicativism, and arithmetism. Let’s explain what those terms mean.
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Restrictive Principles on Entities Adopted in The
Continuum
Definitionism
14 This position refuses to assume a new ideal object (that is a set or a function) if it is not
introduced by the way of an explicit definition of the relation that links its constituent
elements  together.  More  precisely,  an  explicitly  given  relation  (or  property)  is a
relation constructed by the logical principles (cf. below) from the primitive entities of
the  mathematical  domain  with  which  we  are  concerned.  Since  the  mathematical
objects are always preceded by a logical construction, we can distinguish, according to
the logical tradition, between an intensional level and an extensional one.
 
Intuitionism
15 Hermann Weyl’s mathematical universe is restricted in that all the entities assumed
must be generated by the logical principles from a basic category of entities that is given
intuitively. This basic category is a structure made up of primitive objects and relations.
The intuitive knowledge we have of those entities give foundations to the Excluded-
Middle  Principle.  Each  rightly  built  proposition  that  concerns  only  the  primitive
entities  (in particular “existential  propositions” which assert  that  there  is one basic
entity which satisfy one given property) admits one truth-value, regardless our ability
to determine it. Weyl says that such a category is a “complete system of definite self-
existent objects”. (In the present paper, we will always use the term “complete” in this
sense.) We mentioned above that Weyl gave up this feature of his position when he
knew the more radical thought of Brouwer (cf. p. Error: Reference source not found)
middle of paragraph starting with “We could think…”).
 
Predicativism
16 Hermann Weyl  refuses  every  impredicative definition,  that  is  every  definition  which
supposes the prior given information of a totality of entities of which the object to
define  is  one  of  the  members.  Weyl’s  predicativism  is  expressed  by  the
“restricted principle”.  It  consists  in  restricting  the  scopes  of  the  quantifiers1 to  the
primitive entities. This principle permits elimination of the impredicative definitions
while expressing the privileged access we have to the basic categories. 
 
The Logical Principles
17 Those  three  major  theses  of  Weyl’s  position  (definitionism,  intuitionism  and
predicativism)  give  rise  to  the  formulation  of  6  logical  principles  that  can  be
indifferently interpreted as principles of construction of propositions or as principles
of construction of relations.
18 There are six principles:
1) The negation principle
2) The blanks-identification principle
3) The conjunction principle
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4) The disjunction principle
5) The “filling in” principle
6) The “there is” principle [Weyl 1918, 9–10]
19 We don’t give details of those principles. They permit construction of each property (or
relation)  to  be  expressed  in  the  first-order  predicate  language,  from  the  primitive
relations, and including the equality symbol “=” for primitive objects and symbols for
sets, functions and for the membership relation “∈”. According to Weyl’s restricted
principle, the scopes of the quantifiers are restricted to the primitive categories.
 
Arithmetism
20 Weyl demands a very strong completeness condition from the basic categories. Owing
to this fact,  he develops only one such category: that of natural numbers. The only
primitive relation is that of succession.
21 The natural numbers series is important in Weyl’s position because it makes up the
intuitive datum that permits the foundation of a new type of definition of relation (the
principle  of  iteration)  and  therefore  a new  form  of  inference  (the  inference  by
complete induction). Let’s call “arithmetism” the particular foundational status Weyl
gives to the natural numbers series.
22 We are now ready to expose the problems with which we are concerned. 
 
Two Problems in the Understanding of Weyl’s Thought
23 After having introduced the logical principles, Hermann Weyl adds two more principles
to  his  system.  First,  the  principle  of  substitution that  permits  a  relation taken as  an
argument for another relation. Secondly, the principle of iteration that is the foundation
of a kind of recursive definition for set-functions. Finally, Hermann Weyl introduces
the mathematical process that expresses the passage from the intensional point of view
of relations to the extensional point of view of sets and functions. For Hermann Weyl,
this  corresponds  to  the  passage  from  the  domain  of  logics  to  the  domain  of
mathematics. The main difficulties in the understanding of Weyl’s thought arise here.
24 The  first  difficulty  is  linked  to  the  distinction  between  intension  and  extension.
According to  his  predicativist  position,  Weyl  admits  only  the  relations  that  can be
defined when the only totality available is that of natural numbers. In so far, all  the
relations have to be generated before the first and only application of the mathematical
process that introduces the extensional entities in the system (and in particular real
numbers).
25 At first sight, this limitation to a single application of the mathematical process seems
to be incompatible with two others assertions of Weyl:  1) the fact that the two last
principles have to use sets and functions and 2) the fact that Weyl continues to speak of
a  hierarchy between  the  relations  of  his  system.  How  is  it  possible  that  sets  and
functions,  which  are  extensional  entities,  step  in  the  construction  of  relations
(intensions), before the only application of the mathematical process? Moreover, why
does Weyl continue to speak of a hierarchy of entities in his system if there is only one
application of the mathematical process? 
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26 In order to solve these interpretative problems, we have to make explicit the shift Weyl
is obliged to apply to the usual notions of intension and extension. That will be our first
task.
27 The  second  difficulty  is  directly  linked  to  the  principle  of  iteration.  According  to
Solomon Feferman [Feferman 1988], the particular form Weyl gives to this principle is
problematic because we know, since a work of Kleene, that it permits to get over the
first  level,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  Ramified  Theory  of  Types  of  Bertrand Russell
[Russell 1927] contrary to what Weyl himself tells. Our second task will be, not to judge
if his principle of iteration really betrays Weyl’s predicativist position, but rather to
explain the reason for which Weyl expresses this principle in this particular form. It
will call for making explicit the status Weyl is giving to the notion of natural numbers
series.
 
The Shift of the Traditional Distinction between
Intension and Extension
The Mathematical Process
28 In order to understand this shift, we have to display more precisely the mathematical
process. In accordance with the traditional way of speaking, all the relations that can
be constructed by the mean of Weyl’s logical principles from the primitive entities will
be  called  “intensional  entities”.  The  mathematical  process establishes  a  transition
between  those  intensional  entities  and  the  extensional  entities  that  are  sets  and
functions.
29 Let’s  assume  we  have  an  intensional  relation  R(,,…)  Each  argument  is  linked  to  a
category that can be basic or not (for example, the category of sets of numbers). We
have to suppose that the arguments are divided in two groups: the dependent ones and
the independent ones. 
30 (In  this  paper,  we  will  always  adopt  Weyl’s  notation,  using  the  “—”  symbol  to
distinguish dependent variables from independent ones.)
31 • Let’s  talk  firstly  of  the case  n = 0,  that  is  the case  where there is  no independent
variable.  Then,  the  mathematical  process  links  to  the  relation  R(x1,…,xk)  the  k
dimensional set Ř such as we have:
R(x1,…, xk) iff (x1,…, xk) ∈ Ř
Two factors step in this transition from the relation to the set:
1) The variables disappear. In Gottlob Frege’s way of speaking, the set Ř is a saturated
entity on the contrary to the relation from which it is constructed.
2) The identification criterion changes. Let’s quote Weyl.
“Therefore, how two sets […] are defined […] does not determinate their identity
[on the contrary to relations]. Rather an objective fact, which is not decidable from
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the definition in a purely logical way, is decisive; namely, whether each element of
the one set is also an element of the other, and conversely.” [Weyl 1918, 20]
32 • Let’s assume now that n ≠ 0, that is there is at least one independent variable. Then,
the  mathematical  process  links  to  the  relation  R(x1, …, xk|y1, …, yn)  the
function Ř(y1, …,yn) such as we have:
R(x1, …, xk|y1, …, yn) ⇔ (x1,…, xk) ∈ Ř(y1, …,yn)
For each possible value of the arguments, the function Ř(y1, …,yn) becomes a set. This
transition from the relation to the function includes two factors: 
1) One part of the variables disappears (the dependent ones). 
2) The  identification  criterion  changes  in  a similar  way  to  the  case  of  sets.  Two
functions are identical if their values are identical for each possible determination of
the variables. 
33 Thus, we find the same two factors. Let’s make two remarks.
34 First, we can see immediately the difference between this notion of function and the set-
theoretical one to which we are used. Indeed, in Set Theory, the value of a function can
be of any nature whereas in Weyl’s system the value of a function must be a set, i.e.
can’t be a basic object. But this difference is not an essential one. In fact, in order to
express a one-to-one relation between basic objects, the notion of set (in Weyl’s sense)
is enough. Such a relation can be rendered by a two-dimensional set Ř that verify the
property that for each x there is one y such as “(x,y) ∈ Ř”.
35 Secondly, we can see that, in The Continuum,  the notion of function is defined as an
extension of  the notion of  set.  The sets  become borderline cases  of  functions:  those
where the number of independent variables has been reduced to 0.
 
Comparison with the Set-Theoretical Distinction between Intension
and Extension
36 We have distinguished two moments within the transition from relations to sets and
functions: 1) the disappearance of some variables (let’s call it “the abstraction process”)
and 2) the change of identification criterion. In fact, each of those two processes have
his own autonomy and this is a distinctive feature of Weyl’s system. Let’s compare it
with Set Theory.
37 In  Set  Theory,  intensions  are  generally  thought  as  propositional  functions.  More
precisely, they are given by formulas of the set-theoretic language (for example: the
first-order  predicates  language + the  binary  relation  “∈”)  with  one  (or  several)
unbounded variable(s) (of sets). In Set Theory, the principle that permits to make the
transition from intensions to extensions is the “axiom of separation”2.  According to
this principle, for each given set X and for each set theoretical propositional function
Φ(x), ‘x’ being the unbounded variable of the formula, we can assert the existence of the
set {x ∈ X|Φ(x)} of all the elements of X which make true the functional proposition
Φ(x).
38 On  the  contrary  to  intensions,  sets  are  saturated  entities  (they  don’t  contain  any
variable). Moreover, the criterion of identity between sets is extensional, i.e. two sets
are equals if and only if they have the same elements. In so far, we can see that the
process of abstraction and the transition from a logical identity to an extensional one
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are simultaneous. That is the way the notions of intension and extension are usually
conceived in Set Theory.
39 In  The  Continuum,  Weyl  regards  those  two  processes  as  independent. It  is  never
explicitly explained in The Continuum but Weyl gives a few indications in this direction
[Weyl 1918, 40–41] and he confirms this fact in his Letter to Hölder [Weyl 1919, 114–117].
(Cf. also the explanation we give below of “formal” sets and functions)
40 As  a  result  of  this  independence,  there  are  several  types  of  intensional  and  of
extensional entities in Weyl’s universe. As we saw above, when the abstraction process
is entirely applied to a relation, suppressing all the variables, the relation becomes a
set.  And when the abstraction process  is  partly  applied to a  relation,  leaving some
residual variables, the relation becomes a function. Those entities can be considered at
a logical level, i.e. before the change of identification criterion. This independence, in
Weyl’s  system,  between  the  abstraction  process  and  the  change  of  identification
criterion permits to understand why we can use sets and functions in the definition of
relations (intensions) in spite of the fact that all definitions of intensional entities have
to be obtained before the single application of the mathematical process that generate
extensional entities.  Weyl tells  that sets and functions are used in the definition of
relations (intensions) only “in a purely formal way” [Weyl 1918, 40]. In so far, let’s call
“formal” the sets and the functions used in the definitions of relations (intensions).
They are abstract entities for which the identification criterion is still a logical one.
That’s why, in Weyl’s system, we can’t  use the (extensional)  identity of two sets or
functions in the definition of a relation. Those formal sets and functions are useful to
express the fact that a relation is taken as an object for another relation and to express
naturally the substitution and iteration principles (cf. below). Moreover, in his letter to
Hölder,  Weyl  specifies  that  the  use  of  formal  sets  and  functions  wouldn’t  have
permitted to construct new relations between primitive entities without the iteration
principle. [Weyl 1919, 117]
41 As a consequence of the uniqueness of the application of the mathematical process, the
intensional  level  becomes in Weyl’s  system entirely  independent of  the extensional
one.  This  is  contrary  to  Set  Theory  where  there  is  infinity  of  intensional  and  the
extensional levels which are interconnected, extensional entities being used in defining
intensions3.
 
Weyl’s arithmetism: iteration and natural numbers
series
42 Let’s  deal  now  with  the  second  difficulty.  We  have  to  explain  Weyl’s  principle  of
iteration by analysing what we called his “arithmetism”. To understand why Weyl put
the natural numbers series in the centre of the foundations of mathematics, we must
make implicit his conception of the notion of natural number.
43 Two types of intuition are linked to the natural numbers series: 
1) We have the intuition that gives us the natural numbers series as a complete system.
(We defined the word “complete” above).
2) We have the intuition of the iteration. We mean here the intuition by which we can
assert that, when we have a homogeneous operation (that is an operation which links
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each object to another object of the same category), we can then consider the iteration
of this operation an indefinite number of times.
44 Those two intuitions are linked together because: 
1) The category of natural numbers can be regarded as the totality of the elements
obtained by the iteration of the “successor relation” from the number 1.
2) By  the  means  of  the  intuition  of  iteration,  the  completeness  of  the  category  of
natural  numbers  applies  to  every  totality  of  ideal  objects  isomorphic  to  it.  This
isomorphism means not only that this totality can be enumerated (in the usual sense
we give to this  word in mathematics),  but also that this  totality is  produced by an
indefinite  number  of  iterations  of  the  same well-defined  operation  (for  example:  a
recursive series of numbers).
45 Those two intuitions (that of the “completeness” of the natural numbers series, and
that of the possibility to repeat indefinitely the iteration of an homogeneous operation)
are blending together so that Weyl seems to identify them entirely:
“[…] the idea of iteration, i.e., of the sequence of the natural numbers, is an ultimate
foundation of mathematical thought” [Weyl 1918, 48]
46 The second feature we have expounded is an essential one for Weyl’s system4. It shows
that he had, in a way, a formal conception of natural numbers in spite of his rejection of
a formalist opinion on mathematics. His conception of natural numbers is a formal one
in  the  sense  where  what  is  essential  in  the  natural  numbers  series  is  its  iterative
structure. That’s why Weyl think about all series isomorphic to the natural numbers as
complete ones.
47 Nevertheless, his position is not a formalist one because he didn’t think at all that this
structure  emerges  from  arbitrary  choices  such  as  the  conventional  acceptance  of
Peano’s  axioms  for  arithmetic.  We  have  to  remind  that  the  iterative  structure  of
natural numbers is given to us by an intuition, essential for mathematics: the “pure
intuition of iteration”.
48 Our interpretation of Weyl’s notion of natural numbers as a formal one can help us to
explain his principle of iteration.
 
Explanation of Weyl’s Principle of Iteration
49 In  order  to  explain  the  reason  why  Weyl  adopts  the  principle  of  iteration  in  his
particular form, we have first to introduce the principle of substitution.
50 Principle of substitution:
This  principle  permits  to  use  formal  sets  and  functions  to  express  the  fact  that  a
relation is taken as an object for another relation.
Let’s present it on an example.
We  will  use  small  letters  to  designate  variables  of  natural  numbers  and  capital  letters  to
designate variables of sets of natural numbers.
51 Let’s suppose we have, for example, two relations (intensions):
R(x, Y) and S(x). Θ is the (formal) set obtained by the abstraction process on the relation
S(x). Then, the principle of substitution asserts that we can form the new relation T(x)
defined by: T(x) iff R(x, Θ).
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More generally, if S(x|x1, …, xn) is a relation (x being the only dependent variable) and if
Θ (x1, …, xn) is the (formal) function obtained by the abstraction process on the relation
S(x|x1, …, xn), then we can form the new relation T(x,  x1, …, xn) defined by: 
T(x,  x1, …, xn) iff R(x, Θ(x1, …, xn)).
52 Principle of iteration:
Now, we interpret Weyl’s principle of iteration as expressing, at the logical level of the
construction of relations, the completeness of every totality of sets isomorphic to the
natural numbers series, that is of every totality of sets obtained from an intuitively
given set X0 by an indefinite repetition of a same homogeneous set-function.
53 Let’s  take,  for  example,  a  relation  (intension)  R(x|Y).  We  note  “Θ(Y)”  the  function
obtained by the application of the abstraction principle on the relation 
“R(x|Y)”.
We can define the “iterated” relations R2, R3, etc. by:
54 The principle of iteration asserts that, from the relation R and his associated (formal)
function “Θ”, we can form the relation R(n,x|X) defined (by induction) by: 
55 In other words, the iterated relations R2, R3, etc. become instances of the new relation
“Rn”. Quantification is allowed for natural numbers, so we can then express the relation
S(x) defined by: “there is a n such as R(n, x|Y)”. This relation means that x is in a relation
R with one of the sets of the series: Y, Θ(Y), Θ(Θ(Y)), etc. which is isomorphic to the
natural numbers series.
56 Therefore, Weyl’s principle of iteration is a mean to construct and quantify over series
of sets without betraying his predicativist position that forbids direct quantification
over sets. The idea that justifies this principle is Weyl’s arithmetism, i.e. the position
according to which every totality of ideal objects isomorphic to the natural number
series is complete. This idea, without being expressly formulated by Weyl, seems to be
the only one that could justify his principle of iteration.
 
Weyl’s Hierarchy of Sets
57 We have a last interpretative problem to solve. In some important passages of his text,
Weyl refers to the fact that his notion of relation can be, in a way, structured in a bi-
dimensional  hierarchy.  One  of  the  dimensions  is  not  problematic.  Indeed,  Weyl
distinguishes between natural numbers, sets of natural numbers, sets of sets of natural
numbers, etc. Let’s call “types” these different levels. We have referred to the fact that
all the variables are “typed” in Weyl’s system. Variables of natural numbers will be of
type 0, variables of sets of numbers will be of type 1, etc. Therefore, relations can be
ordered according to the types of their variables. In particular, we have an infinity of
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membership relations: ∈1, ∈2, etc. The first one links a number to a set of numbers. The
second links a set of numbers to a set of sets of numbers, etc.
58 Nevertheless,  the interpretation of the second dimension is  problematic. It  can’t  be
interpreted like  in  Russell’s  Ramified Theory of  Types  because,  if  we put  aside  the
principle of iteration, Weyl’s restricted principle means that he assumes only entities of
level one in Russell’s hierarchy.
59 To solve this problem, we have to use the distinction we made between the abstraction
process and the change of identification criterion in the transition from intension to
extension. Indeed, the double-hierarchy of Weyl’s sets is obtained at the logical level,
before the application of the mathematical process. The possibility to define a second
dimension in the classification is from the possibility of the disappearance of some set-
variables, using formal sets and functions in the principle of substitution.
60 Let’s define the first level of relations. Let’s call it “level 0”. It contains all the relations
that can be defined according to Weyl’s principles with the primitive entities (natural
numbers and successor relation) but without using the membership relations (∈1, ∈2, 
etc.). All these relations link together only natural numbers. They are therefore of type
0. For example: the successor relation (between two natural numbers) f(x,y) itself taken
as a primitive relation.
61 Let’s define now the second level of relations (“level 1”). It contains all the relations
that can be defined, according to Weyl’s principles, with the membership relation ∈1
and (possibly) with the primitive entities. We can find, among those relations, relation
of type 1 (that is  a  relation which have at  least  one set-variable),  for example:  the
relation (x∈1Y) itself. Nevertheless, we can find also relation of level 1 but of type 0. For
example, let’s take a (formal) function θ(x) which has been obtained by the abstraction
process applied to a relation R(y|x) of the level 0. Then, the principle of substitution
permits to form the relation T(x, y) defined by: T(x, y) iff (x ∈1 θ (y)). The relation T is of
type 0 (all its variables are numbers-variables) but it is of level 1 because we need the
“∈1” relation to define it. This possibility, at level 1, to define a 0-typed relation is what
Weyl called ‘‘‘recoils’ to earlier levels” [Weyl 1918, 40].
62 Therefore, the greatest difference with Russell’s Ramified Theory of Types is that the
levels, in this hierarchy, don’t depend on the supposition of the totality of the elements
of the inferior levels. Every relation of level n depend on a finite number of relations of
level <n. This fact permits to avoid impredicative definitions without having to relate
each property or relation to one given level like in Russell’s RTT (without the axiom of
reducibility).
63 Finally, the double hierarchy evoked by Weyl must be interpreted as in Fig.:
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(Double-)hierarchy of relations in The Continuum
64 The  text  of  The  Continuum [Weyl  1918,  29–40]  suggests  that  Weyl  tried  two  other
possibilities before assuming this kind of bi-dimensional hierarchy (that is hierarchical
only in a weak sense).
65 Firstly, he adopted a system equivalent to Russell’s Ramified Theory of Types but was
not satisfied.  He thought that this  bi-dimensional  hierarchy,  in a strong sense,  was
artificial and useless. [Weyl 1918, 32]
66 Then, he adopted a new system where we could iterate the mathematical process an
indefinite number of times. In this system, we could use the “there is” principle only
during the first application of the mathematical process. The other applications were
restricted in the sense where we spoke of a “restricted principle” on page 5. We could
then avoid impredicative definitions. Perhaps, Weyl was not satisfied of this second
system because the logical level of intensions and the mathematical level of extensions
were not independent. Because of the plurality of the applications of the mathematical
process, we had to think of infinitely many intensional and extensional interconnected
levels (like in the appendix below).
67 Only in the last system we have expounded, the logical and the mathematical levels are
independent because of the uniqueness of the application of the mathematical process.
In order to develop this system, Weyl had to think independently of what we called
“the abstractive process” and of the change of identification criterion in what he called
“the mathematical process” (see subsection “The Mathematical Process” (p. 6) and the
next). In fact, his last system assumes only one application of the mathematical process
but an indefinite number of applications of the abstractive process. That’s why his bi-
dimensional hierarchy is weak.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix - The Interrelations between The Intensional and the Extensional Levels
in the Model of Constructible Sets for Set Theory
In order to explain Weyl’s notions of intension and extension, we can compare them
with the notions of intension and extension that are inherent to the theory of
constructible sets for Set Theory. We chose this theory because it is closer to Weyl’s one
than the more general Set Theory.
In Set Theory, if we adopt the axiom of regularity that states that the relation ∈ on any
family of sets is well-founded, we can construct the universe of sets as a cumulative
hierarchy.
We define, by induction, for every ordinal number α, the class Vα of the sets of level α.
V∅ is, by definition, {∅}. For every successor ordinal α+, we have: Vα+ = P(Vα) (the power-
set of the class Vα). For every limit ordinal α, we have: Vα =∩β<α Vβ (the union of the
previous classes) Then, the universe of Set Theory is thought of as the union of all the
classes Vα. [Jech 1978, 63–65]
This definition of the universe of Set Theory depends on what we mean by a “subset” of
a given set X (the power-set of X being the set of all subsets of X). In the universe of 
constructible sets, the power-set operator has a precise sense when it is applied to Vα to
obtain Vα+. (For constructible sets, we then call the levels of the hierarchy “Lα” instead
of “Vα”.) Indeed, a set Y that belongs to Lα+ must admit a definition “Y={x ∈ Lα|φ(x)}”
where φ is an intension of level α. Such an intension is a first-order formula with the
“∈” symbol, the “=” symbol, constant symbols and variable symbols for sets belonging
to Lα [Jech 1978, 175–176]. The fact that equality between sets is used in the definition of
intensions and the fact that the quantifiers can be used without restriction show us
that the sets that take place in these definitions are not “formal” sets like in Weyl’s
system but are really extensional entities. Moreover, the definition of the extensional
entities that belong to Lα+ depends on the intensional entities of level α which depends
itself on the extensional entities that belong to Lα. Contrary to what happens in Weyl’s
system, we have an alternate series of intensional levels and of extensional levels that
are interconnected.
NOTES
1. Actually, Herman Weyl doesn’t use any explicit quantifier in his logical system. Nevertheless,
we can express properly Weyl’s ideas in the language of first-order predicate logic with which we
are used to. This is what we do in the following.
2. This axiom belongs to the different set theories : Z, ZF and ZFC. We can’t develop here the main
ideas of Set Theory nor the first-order predicates calculus. The reader may refer to classical texts
like [Fraenkel 1953].
3. To show the distance between Weyl’s position and Set Theory, we give in the appendix an
example of the interrelations between the intensional and the extensional levels in the model of
the constructible sets for Set Theory.
4. We give four textual arguments that show that Weyl defends such a “formal and iterative”
notion of the natural number series :
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1) The fact that Weyl liken the idea of the iteration to the idea of the natural numbers series itself
and of its completeness. (cf. below and [Weyl 1918, 48])
2) The particular form of the principle of iteration that Weyl assumes. We will see above that this
principle expresses the idea of preceding item 1.
3) Weyl doesn’t assume any isolated essence for each natural number. The only satisfactory way
to define a number is to give his place in the succession.
4) Weyl agrees with an axiomatic point of view on the natural numbers series, providing that we
give their real status to axioms (i.e., that we take them not for a conventional definition but for
an expression of the intuition of the iteration).
ABSTRACTS
In The Continuum, Hermann Weyl gives new bases to the notions of set and function. With them,
he  constructs  mathematics  close  to  physics  and  solves  the  continuum  problem.  Those  new
notions are so unusual with respect to Set Theory that they are often misunderstood.
We propose to explain the meaning of Weyl’s reform of those notions. We first make a synthesis
of  his  main  epistemological  thesis,  and  then propose  a  comparative  approach  to  stress  the
distance between the mathematical  and logical  principles  of  The  Continuum and those  of  Set
Theory. Our discussion will be centred on the distinction between intension and extension, and
on the place Weyl gives to natural numbers for the foundations of analysis.
Dans le Continu, Hermann Weyl donne une nouvelle assise aux notions d’ensemble et de fonction,
pour assurer aux mathématiques leur applicabilité à la physique, et résoudre ainsi le problème
du continu. Les notions introduites, éloignées de la théorie des ensembles, prêtent à confusion et
à multiples interprétations.
Nous nous proposons d’éclairer le sens du déplacement que Weyl opère dans ces notions. Nous
présentons une synthèse des thèses  épistémologiques soutenues dans Le  Continu et  résolvons
certains problèmes interprétatifs. Par une approche comparative, nous soulignons l’écart entre
les principes logico-mathématiques du Continu et ceux de la théorie des ensembles. Nous nous
centrons sur la distinction entre intension et extension, et sur la place attribuée aux entiers
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